The perception of the lightness of surfaces has been shown to be affected by information about the spatial configuration of those surfaces and their illuminants. For example, two surfaces of equal luminance can appear to be of very different lightness if one of the two appears to lie in a shadow. How are we to understand the character of the processes that integrate such spatial configuration information so as to yield the eventual appearance of lightness? This paper makes some simple observations about the vocabulary of appearance used in these contexts, and proposes that the end results can be called "phenomenal" in a traditional sense of that word. Processes whose products are phenomenal are next distinguished from processes characterized in other terms: (a) processes of perceptual grouping; (b) processes of perceptual organization; and (c) attentional (as opposed to preattentive) processes. These four categories are conceptually and empirically distinct. In particular, the paper reviews some evidence that appearances as of contours, occlusion, and amodally completed shapes can occur preattentively. Some implications for understanding gestalt grouping processes are briefly discussed.
It is not difficult to show that experimental psychologists use various notions of perceptual appearance--of how perceptible items look, or appear, or seem to the subject perceiving them. Examples are rife in the lightness constancy literature. Here for example is Adelson (1993) describing the "customary terminology" (his Fig. 1 is to the right):
... lightness refers to the apparent reflectance of a surface in a scene, whereas brightness refers to the apparent luminance of a patch in the image itself. ... In Fig. 1 , patches a and c are obviously brighter than patch b because they are seen to have higher luminance on the page. Patch c also appears lighter than patch b, in that the three-dimensional (3D) physical surface represented by c seems to be painted a lighter shade of gray than b. On the other hand, patches a and b seem to have the same lightness, as they appear to represent surfaces painted the same shade. (Adelson 1993 (Adelson , 2042 It may not be entirely clear what "apparent reflectance" is, but it is clear that lightness is not the same as the physical reflectance of that surface. A major task for accounts of lightness processing is to explain why and how lightness differs from the physical properties characterizing the stimuli. This paper will focus on examples in which information about the spatial layout of the surfaces has a pronounced effect on their perceived lightness; sometimes (most spectacularly) an effect that is independent of their Clark, Spatial Organization 2 luminance. Adelson's "checker shadow" illusion is a compelling example (see Fig. 3, below) . Discussions of it provide other examples of the use the vocabulary of appearance:
A process interpretation that is consistent with this result (but not compelled by it) is that the mechanisms that generate appearance act on the output of early image encoding mechanisms and that the action of these appearance mechanisms is most strongly revealed by the shadow stimulus configuration. To be effective at stabilizing appearance, such a mechanism would need access to information about the adapted state of the earlier image encoding mechanisms ... as well as information about lighting variation in the scene. We cannot at this point make any definitive statement about how or at what stage in the visual pathways this information begins to affect lightness processing. (Hillis & Brainard 2007 , 1718 The question I want to discuss is precisely how to characterize the "mechanisms that generate appearance", in particular those that contribute spatial information to lightness processing. But first it will be helpful to produce one more example. Here are Gilchrist et al. describing the effect of grouping factors ("belongingness") on lightness:
The Benary (1924) effect ... was offered by Wertheimer as evidence of the crucial role of belongingness. The gray triangle that appears to lie on top of the black cross appears lighter than the gray triangle that appears to lie on the white background, despite the fact that the two triangles have equivalent surrounds. Each triangle borders white on its hypotenuse and black on the perpendicular sides. In terms of belongingness, however, when perceptual structure is taken into account, one triangle appears to belong to the black background, and it appears lighter than the other triangle that appears to belong to the white background... (Gilchrist et al. 1999, 816) Here we have apparent spatial relations ("appears to lie on top of", "appears to lie on the white background") affecting lightness ("appears lighter than") because of the grouping ("appears to belong to") that those spatial relations induce. Relations are proposed among processes characterized in three differ ent ways. Some terms describe the perceived spatial relations, others the grouping processes, and a final set describe appearances ("appears lighter than") as the end result. Now the philosophers in this workshop have no special competence to decide whether the quoted propositions are true or false. But they will all want to know what they mean. How are we to understand these characterizations? What sense can we make of the relations between them? I.
One notable feature of these examples is that the appearances described all Clark, Spatial Organization 3 appear to characterize portions of the external world. That is, they seem to be properties and relations of the items (objects, events, or whatever entities) that the subject perceives. They don't seem to be properties of one's own mental states, or properties characterizing what it is like to have those mental states. Instead what seem to bear these properties are, for example, different parts of the surface of the object, or different polygons printed on the page of paper. The bearers seem firmly situated in the external world, out there cheek by jowl with other objects. It is not only the subjects who ascribe appearances to the things perceived. The investigators take the explanatory task to be explaining why (for example) patch a and patch b appear to the subject to differ in lightness, when in fact those portions of the external world yield the same luminance. The mismatch between the apparent lightness of the patches and their luminance generates the explanatory problem. Now there are many different notions of what it is for a property or process to be "phenomenal", but these attributes of the appearance of perceptible items satisfy a traditional, indeed ancient, version of that concept. Phenomena are appearances; a "phenomenal" property is one that characterizes how things appear. This usage can be traced to ancient worries about the distinction between appearance and reality. The contrast becomes a live one if there is a possibility of perceptual illusion. I think our vocabulary of appearance, or at least the ancient version of it, derives its animating force from the occasional episode of perceptual illusion. In such an episode something appears to be F but is not F; how it seems is at odds with how it is. To mark the contrast we employ various idioms: what Chisholm called the "verbs of appearance" (such as the non-epistemic senses of "looks", "seems", "appears" and so on) adjectival forms ("apparent", "subjective", etc), adverbial forms ("seemingly" "apparently") and nominalizations ("appearances").
All this vocabulary gains traction and finds a distinctive use in contexts in which there is a possibility of perceptual illusion. To put it another way: talk of perceptual illusion is, paradigmatically, talk employing the traditional notion of phenomenal properties. If we are confident that a perceptual situation contains an illusion, then we are confident that in that situation some perceptible items appear somehow to the subject perceiving them. We are also confident that those items are not as they appear; that's what makes it an illusion. How we gain this confidence--how we justify the claim that the situation contains an illusion--is a separate and difficult question; here the point is confined to what follows when we have it.
If talk of illusions is paradigmatically phenomenal property talk, then the three passages above all traffic in the phenomenal. One of the triangles in the Benary illusion looks lighter than the other, even though it is not. In these usages there is no requirement that appearances always or often diverge from reality; typically, thankfully, two patches that look to be of different lightnesses are of different lightnesses. But the vocabulary gains traction in contexts in which there is a non-trivial possibility of illusion: of things appearing to be something they are not. I believe the occurrence (or non-zero probability) of Clark, Spatial Organization 4 illusion provides a clear threshold (a sufficient condition) for the applicability of these idioms of appearance. However we analyze it, if something that is not F can appear to be F, then we will need to distinguish appearing to be F from being F. In such an event we can't explain how the thing appears if we confine ourselves to the properties that it has, since per hypothesis the properties that it has do not include one that it appears to have. So the explanation of illusion traditionally, and understandably, appeals to properties and processes outside of those of the object of perception per se. Typically the appeal is to percep tual processes within the subject who is perceiving the object in question.
I belabor these points in part because of a rather surprising sentence that occurred in a recent BBS commentary. In their commentary on Block (2007) , Naccache and Dehaene say:
We are still waiting for a clear, empirically usable definition of "phenomenality" or "qualia" that goes beyond what can be done based on subjects' reports alone. (Naccache & Dehaene 2007, 519) Now it is true that the technical terms "phenomenality" and "qualia" have implications and uses that differ from the traditional notion, and that their relations to reportability are strained. But it is worth emphasizing that there already exists an empirically usable notion of "phenomenal" characterization that goes beyond subjects' reports, and that it has been used for a long time--more than two years!--within experimental psychology. For proof, consult almost any portion of the vast literature on perceptual illusion. What grounds these applications of the vocabulary of appearance is not introspection, or some dodgy appeal to consciousness, but rather the possibility of illusion. I think this is well understood in the native tongue of experimental psychology; it has been confused recently only because an invasive alien variant ("phenomenal consciousness") was imported from philosophy of mind, and now competes with the native flora.
Somewhat more broadly: we don't necessarily need the applicability of the vocabulary of illusion. A slightly broader criterion allows the vocabulary of appearance to apply whenever one has any perceptual variant of intentional inexistence: any seeming perception of features that are not actual. (This broader criterion applies to dreams, hallucinations, and other seeming perceptions which some might be loathe to describe as "illusions".) So if in some context we distinguish between "subjective" features and real ones or "apparent" features and real ones, then that context will satisfy descriptions couched in the vocabulary of appearance. At that point one has already invoked states that have one kind of "phenomenal" or "qualitative" character.
If we trace visual pathways upwards from the receptors, at what point do processes therein begin to satisfy our "phenomenal" locutions--our terminology of appearance and illusion? And how are those processes related to others characterized variously as cognitive, as attentional, or as processes of perceptual grouping?
Certainly one can find examples in the neuroscience literature of the application of the vocabulary of appearance to surprisingly early portions of visual processing. For example, "subjective" features (in fact, merely subjective features, as in "subjective contours") are formed early--perhaps as early as V2 (see Lesher 1995) . Occlusion cues, junction cues, and other "pictorial cues" for depth are also thought to be processed in the early, preattentive portions of visual processing. Finally, "shape from shading" requires that information about shadows inform the perception of shape, so the organizing of the visual field into shaded and unshaded portions must happen relatively early. These are all spatial and organizational "cues", and they all play a role in lightness processing. So it will be interesting to see how early we can find appearances of them.
II
To make a start on this question I want to consider some particularly vivid examples presented in Adelson (1993 Adelson ( , 2000 . Why for example is the "checker shadow" illusion considered to be an illusion? Well, squares A and B appear to be of different lightness. A appears to be a dark square of the checkerboard, B a light one, lying in a shadow. But if one blocks the surrounds, one can see that A and B in fact match. Those portions of the piece of paper are printed in the same shade of gray. They have the same "gray scale" (or "raster") values; those portions will typically reflect the same luminance towards the eye. Fig. 3 . On the left is the "checker shadow" illusion (Adelson 1995) . Right: the "corrugated plaid" (Adelson 1993 (Adelson , 2043 . In it a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , and b 2 are all the same shade of gray.
The presence of shadows (more generally, the condition of illumination) is one of the key elements of the "spatial configuration" information playing a role in the lightness effects Adelson described. A vivid example is found in his "corrugated plaid" (or "corrugated Mondrian") illusion. Here the raster values for the constituent polygons are identical in the two sub-figures. They differ at most in shape and size. For example, in A the third polygon in the second row is a parallelogram, while in B it is a square. These changes in shape give the overall figure different apparent shapes; A has a corrugation running horizontally, while B has a vertical one. (Interestingly both figures are reversible; the corrugation can be seen as a bump or a trough.) In B the two indicated squares appear to be coplanar, and seem to be equally illuminated. One can see that they match. Whereas in A, even though the two polygons have the same luminance as one another (and the same as the pair in B) one of them appears to lie in the shadow cast by the raised bump, and it appears to be a lighter surface, lying in shadow.
Since the raster values of the polygons in the two subfigures are the same, the differences in apparent lightness seen in the corrugated Mondrian can't be explained by local contrasts or ratios of luminance found at the edges of each polygon. Instead the effects are chalked up to differences in spatial configur ation, which somehow influences the lightness processing. The notion of a "shadow" isn't powerful enough to explain the effects on lightness. One reason was demonstrated by Todorovic (1997) who produced the version on the left side of Fig. 4 . The lightness illusion persists even though no consistent shading model can account for it. One might describe the difference as one of apparent illumination: the third row appears as if (for whatever reason) it is illuminated by less light than the others. But Adelson (2000) has introduced the more generalizable notion of an "atmosphere", which is just a transfer function from surface reflectances to luminances applying to particular regions of the ambient optic array. The notion can han dle not just shadows and illumination differences but also transparencies and hazes. See Fig. 5 , which illustrates the "haze" illusion. Here again the indi cated subregions have identical raster values. The only differences are found in the inducers at the corners. One seems to see the same white surface in both Clark, Spatial Organization 7 figures, but on the right one seems to see it through a haze. Adelson remarks that the figure makes an atmosphere "perceptible as such". Of course in fact there is no haze present. The figure induces the impression of an intentional inexistent, lying between the surface and one's eyes, and through which one seems to see that surface. The difficulty lies in getting clear about what sort of perceptual spatial organization is required for these lightness effects, and then in understanding how processes that register that organization can affect the "lightness pro cessing". And how is it that the end point yields a difference in appearances? It is one thing if the first process classifies some kinds of edges, and the end result describes lightness values. But how do we affect a process whose result is that one region looks darker than the other?
Consider the corrugated Mondrians from Fig. 4 . A natural way to describe the difference in spatial configuration is that one sees the various polygons in the figure as surfaces oriented in three dimensions. That's how they appear. These surfaces own their edges, have a completed shape, and appear to be oriented at particular angles. They can be transparent or opaque, and can seem to have a particular degree of lightness or transparency. Some appear to be coplanar and to share borders; those borders are reflectance borders. Others are oriented differently, however, and some of the edges between neighbors appear as discontinuities in slant or tilt. Across those there appear to be illumination differences. The fourth row in (B) seems to lie in different illumination than the second; in (A) the fourth row appears to have a constant lightness, though some squares are better illuminated than others. In brief we have whatever degree of spatial organization is required for some of the lines in the figure to appear to be boundaries where the illumination changes; not all the edges appear to be reflectance edges. With that it is possible to see two polygons of equal luminance as surfaces with different lightnesses but differently illuminated.
Such an account would read the "spatial configuration" information as all that is required perceptually to register spatial relations up to the point at least of differentiating surface properties from properties of the illumination. Distinct portions of the figure seem to be characterized by a different condi tions of illumination. The two squares appear of different lightness because one of them appears to be illuminated by more or less light. But notice that this attributes the apparent lightness to differences in spatial appearances. The explanandum is an appearance and the explananda cite other appearances. The haze illusion suggests that spatial configuration information is not exhausted by details of all the visible surfaces, but must include atmospheres as well: transparencies, shadows, hazes. These also have boundaries, sub regions, extents, and spatial relations to one another and to the visible surfaces. So we organize the layout of surfaces, and we organize the atmospheres through which those surfaces are visible. The illusion bears striking simil arities to a Kanizsa subjective figure. Here though the intentional inexistent is not a surface, but an atmosphere. It is a region or volume characterized by a different transfer function, through which one seems to see surfaces. As in the Kanizsa figure, there is no difference in the interior, but only in the corners, at the "inducers". Yet one sees the entire region between the inducers as hazy--as characterized by that same transfer function. So we have a kind of "modal completion" of a subjective visible entity, here an atmosphere. Instead of filling in of color or lightness, we have filling in of a different optical property: a transfer function.
III
It seems well established that somewhere in visual processing there are interactions between information about spatial configuration (including at least information about edges, junction types, surface orientation, and conditions of illumination) and the processes that yield the appearances of lightness. But how exactly should we characterize these interactions? If the end result is an appearance must the inputs be appearances? Must they be conscious? The interactions can be described as following certain rules: for example, the principles governing the appearance of transparency, edge ownership, and occlusion in a Kanizsa figure. So are these interactions cognitive, rule follow ing processes akin to inferences, as Rock (1983) suggests? If so, the conclus ion is not a statement, but an appearance: that the figure looks like a square, lying on top of four circles that it partially occludes.
To make a start, we need to distinguish (at least!) four different categories that are sometimes confused in discussions of this subject. I've already characterized what I mean by "phenomenal", and the first category might as well be called "phenomenal processes": processes that yield some perceptual appearance. These are what Hillis & Brainard (2007 , 1718 called the "mech anisms that generate appearance". But the other categories of characterization include: (2) processes of perceptual grouping; (3) processes of perceptual organization, and (4) processes that require selective attention.
A "perceptual grouping process" is one in which distinct elements or individuals are perceived as, or perceived to make up, a group. We need some group, some elements that make it up, and the perception of those elements as making up that group. The grouping process might group the parts of an object into an object, or the members of a collection into a collection. An example of a grouping process in action is found when one sees the geese in a flock as a flock. Another is to see the undetached parts of a goose as making up a goose. Grouping processes can be as variegated as the wholes one can compose from distinctly perceptible parts (or individuals or elements), and the groups can be nested hierarchically. The only constraint is that the elements must be perceived as composing a whole.
In contrast a process that yields some variety of "perceptual organization" (or "articulation") has to do more than mere grouping. Grouping is a minimal kind of organizing, but the only relation it employs is that of composition, of elements into a larger whole. Whereas discussions of perceptual organization typically include other relations among the parts. The flock of geese is constituted by the bare "is a member of" relation. If one sees the flock as having the shape of a "V" heading southwards, then perception is picking up additional relations between those members. Spatial relations are prime candidates, but any others that can structure the elements, members, or parts can also help to "organize" them.
Some of these grouping and organizing processes might require selective attention or top-down executive control, but some might not, and that is the point of noting the fourth category. I think it is clearest to define "preattentive processes" as those that do not require selective attention and can proceed independently of attentional amplification. Such amplification effects have been found in very early vision (eg V1), so it is difficult to rule out the possibility that even very early processes might enjoy the benefits of selection by selective attention. But many can proceed without it, and perhaps do so most of the time; those would be "preattentive". Whereas "attentional" processes require the enhancing effects of selection by selective attention. These have to engage central or general-purpose resources for their solution; they are not "early", but "late". According to the global workspace model, for example, maintaining patterns of activity in the global workspace requires attentional amplification (see Dehaene & Naccache, 2001 ). Picking the words for an introspective report, consciously deciding what to do, or later remem bering any of these activities are three paradigmatic examples that, according to that model, require active processes in the global workspace, and so require attentional amplification .
The attentional v. preattentive contrast has uneasy relations with some other headline-grabbing categories that live nearby. The biggest is conscious v. unconscious, but others include experiential v. non-experiential; introspectible v. non-introspectible; explicit v. implicit; reportable v. non-reportable; topdown v. bottom-up; and central executive v. lowly module. It is probably safest to assume that there are no necessary connections pair-wise between any of these. So for example one might think that if S is attending to x then necessarily S is conscious of x, but it seems there are empirically distinguishable varieties of attentional processes, and for some of them the conditional is not true. Not all attentional activation is top-down, so it does not always reflect the actions of central or executive cognitive functions.
Perceptual grouping and organization processes may or may not have phenomenal sequela; they may or may not be identifiable by some distinctive kind of perceptual appearance. For example, when one sees one of Rubin's ambiguous figures as a pair of faces, and then later as a vase, such "seeing as" arguably has both sets of properties. The figure presents a particular appearance--it looks like a pair of faces--and in that appearance the scene is organized in a particular way. The faces own the edges; the space between them is the background; the faces complete as recognizable profiles, and so on. When the aspect shifts we get both a different appearance and a different perceptual organization: edge ownership changes, figure/ground relations change, and so on. But distinctive phenomenal appearances might not be consequent upon every kind of perceptual organization. Consider for example the organizing of scattered discontinuities of intensity into edges, the sorting of junction types (T, X, psi, etc), or the solving of correspondence problems in apparent motion, stereopsis, or saccades. These might all be "nonphenomenal" in the sense that the completion of the process is not necessarily sufficient to yield a distinctive appearance--one that occurs if and only if that process completes. Vision has a lot of data to process, and a lot of the initial organizing may be just that--"data processing"--preceding the stages at which phenomenal vocabulary gains traction.
As urged earlier, intentional inexistence is one sure sign that we have reached those stages. The earliest stages though seem adequately characterized in sparser intentional terminology, as processing Shannon-Weaver style "information" about stimuli, or as manipulating "natural signs" that track those stimuli. Neither idiom can sustain intentional inexistence. That is, there can't be Shannon-Weaver information about something that does not exist. While the early visual system might be processing "natural signs" of luminance differences, we can't find therein a token that is a natural sign of a merely subjective contour. There are natural signs of deer in the woods, but not of unicorns. (Of course there might be signs that are mistaken to be signs of unicorns, but that's a different question.) While humans can certainly hunt for non-existent deer, it is not possible to track non-existent deer. An intentional inexistent leaves no signs of itself moving through the woods. It can't. Nor can it have any kind of correlation with signals at the output end of an information channel. So if the earliest stages of vision are adequately char acterized as processing information, manipulating natural signs, or tracking their objects, then they are not sufficiently sophisticated to yield an intentional inexistent. To get the perception as of the latter, one must add something that isn't present in the field of view.
The early processes might not themselves be phenomenal, even though they yield results that when used in certain ways by other processes yield results that are phenomenal. There may be further processes required (most notably of organizing these bits of data into surfaces with borders, orientations, and conditions of illumination) before we reach something that appears somehow. Another way to put this is that even the most elementary appear ances are as of surfaces which own borders, are oriented in space, etc.; they are not of discontinuities of intensity, end-stops, blobs, retinal disparities, saccadic correspondences, and such like. So the processing of all that earlier stuff might not be such as yet to yield any kind of appearance.
Consider next the relation between perceptual grouping and perceptual organization. There are examples of what one might call "bare" grouping processes--processes that do nothing more than form a group. The simplest is probably "image segmentation", defined by Driver et al. as: ... grouping together those parts of the retinal input which are likely to correspond to parts of the same object in the real world, separately from those which are likely to belong to other objects. (Driver et al 2001, 62) Notice that such segmentation applies only to image-level data; that is, to spatially delimited parts of retinal input. Perceptible edges can be used to segment that data by dividing and grouping it into sub-regions. Here a "group" is just a collection of such subregions as are likely to "correspond to parts of the of the same object". But this grouping does not require or presume any further structuring relations among those regions of retinal input.
Another example of an (almost) bare grouping process is the sort that yields "subitizing"--the instant enumerability of sufficiently small groups. For sufficiently small N, one can immediately perceive a group of N members as being a group of N, and as distinct from a group of N-1 or of N+1. The "grouping" process here is whatever allows for this instant discriminability of groups of different cardinality.
Any perception of relations among elements other than the bare "is a member of" yields at least some degree of organization in addition to grouping. An example is described by Gilchrist et al. in their account of "frameworks". Initially it may seem that a framework is just any group, since "A framework is a group of surfaces that belong to each other, more or less." (Gilchrist et al. 1999, 804) Furthermore, "belongingness" and "grouping factors" can vary in strength. But what puts paid to this suggestion is that grouping factors are gestalt grouping factors, and those impose considerable structure:
A set of coplanar surfaces appear to belong together and thus constitute a framework. A set of surfaces moving in the same direction also constitute a framework, which is based on the principle of common fate. A group of surfaces lying in shadow constitute a framework as well. The strongest factor is probably coplanarity, at least when the luminance range is large .... Classic gestalt grouping factors like proximity, good continuation, common fate, and similarity are also effective. Edge sharpness, T-junctions, and X-junctions (especially when they are ratio-invariant) are important factors in belongingness as well. Finally, many empirical results appear to require that retinal proximity be treated as a weak but inescapable grouping factor... (Gilchrist et al. 1999, 805) So for example coplanarity not only defines a group but also characterizes a rather restrictive spatial organization relation among its elements.
In fact the reason I highlight these four kinds of characterization of perceptual processes is that some accounts of gestalt grouping employ all four, and assume they are conjoined. Clearly gestalt grouping processes yield groups, but they also organize those groups, using various relations. For example coplanarity, proximity, good continuation, and common fate not only allow the perception of groups but also attribute particular kinds of spatiotemporal organization to the elements of those groups. Many gestalt psycholo gists clearly thought these principles also to be phenomenal: thought them, that is, to help explain how things look. Grouping principles applicable to ambig uous figures were thought to explain their change in appearance. Finally, these organizing principles were thought also to be introspectively accessible; they have effects on appearance to which observers can attend, and about which verbal reports can agree. Much of the evidence for gestalt grouping processes derived from single-observer demonstrations--fodder for solipsists!--for which the only prerequisite was careful attention to the appearance of a figure printed on a page. The changes in appearance are not minute, and do not require any special introspective training to detect. The gestalt processes have, per hypothesis, noticeable effects on how things look.
Classically some of the gestalt grouping processes were thought to be imposed by the subject on a collection of stimuli that could conceivably be grouped or organized in different ways. Grouping required top-down attention: an action of the "central executive", in Rock's terms (1983). Treisman's (1988) proposition that feature-binding requires attention bears a family resemblance to the same idea. The propositions conjoin predicates characterizing gestalt grouping, appearance, and attention. Since gestalt grouping is both a grouping and the imposition of a structure on the elements of the group, we have what I will call a "fourfold" conjunction, of grouping, organization, appearance, and attention.
In Rubin's ambiguous figures, for example, the shifting "perceptual organization" is reflected in a change in appearance. You see it as a vase, then as a pair of faces, etc. The change in perceptual organization is not merely a change in perceptual grouping--of what belongs with what--in that apparent occlusions, ownership of edges, and figure v. ground all change as well. The shift in apparent perspective from which one sees the Necker cube is not a change in "grouping" but it is a change in perceptual organization. And in the case of ambiguous figures some of these changes in perceptual organization are also changes in appearance: they affect how things look.
IV
How well does this four-fold conjunction hold up? At least two of these categories, the "phenomenal" and the "attentional", can, I think, be dissociated decisively from one another. Processes sufficient to sustain the applicability of the vocabulary of appearance do not require selective attention. Or to put it another way, in tracing routes upward from the receptors I believe we can arrive at stages at which subject S is being appeared-to in a particular fashion, and is potentially subject to illusions, well before we arrive at stages that require selective attention. These stages are preattentive, and they are subject to illusion. Call them "preattentive illusions".
The argument rests on the kind of spatial perceptual organization required for the lightness effects seen in Adelson's corrugated plaid or haze illusions. These effects are require at least enough spatial perceptual organization to differentiate shadows (or other variations in "atmospheres") from changes in surface properties. That in turn probably requires the representation of sur faces oriented in three dimensions, some sorting of edge types into reflectance and illumination edges, and so on. For my purposes the critical point is that the processes yielding this organization occur either in "early" vision or perhaps in "mid-level" vision, but certainly not late. They do not require central cognitive resources or the attentions of the executive. Now the key features of perceptual spatial organization required for these lightness effects are required as well for the perception of figures that have been extensively studied in the experimental literature: Kanizsa subjective figures. See Fig. 6 . We have, first, the completed subjective contours running between the inducers, yielding an appearance of continuous reflectance borders in regions where there is no luminance change at all. Second, the subjective figure itself appears to own those borders--they appear to be the borders of the square. So we have "modal" completion of a shape; one seems to see a square (or in other cases a triangle, etc). Third, that figure looks lighter than its background. We get modal completion of the lightness as well; it "fills in" the entire figure. Fourth, the inducers appear to be occluded by that figure; it looks as if there is a square (or a triangle, etc) lying on top of the inducers and the background. Finally, those inducers are "amodally" completed; they appear to be circles, occluded by the figure lying atop them.
The intermediary case between these and Adelson's "atmospheres" is the discovery of transparent Kanizsa figures. In these the edges appear not to be reflectance edges (or lightness edges) but rather the edges of atmospheres; it is as if one is seeing a portion of the figure through a translucent film. Never theless there is in effect "modal completion" of that atmosphere: instead of a region that appears everywhere lighter than its background, there appears a region that is everywhere transparent, through which one seems to see that background. And the shape of the region so characterized also completes: one seems to see a transparent square.
Kanizsa subjective figures will be my main example of preattentive illusions. I think a compelling case has been made that such figures are per ceived preattentively. The stimulus has effects that it would have only if it was perceived as a square or a triangle (etc.), yet those effects do not require selection by selective attention. Fig. 7 The polygons in (a) and (b) have the same raster values, but in (a) they look like cubes, and the oddball "pops out". In (b) it does not. (From Enns and Rensink 1990.) The first experiments focused on how merely apparent features could, if singular, enhance visual search, by allowing "pop out". Some of the earliest, done by Enns & Rensink (1990) coincidentally happened to employ shading and junction cues for three dimensional shape (see Fig. 7 ). Just like Adelson's corrugated Mondrian, the "raster values" of the polygons in (a) and (b) are identical. All that differs is "spatial configuration information" that suffices to make the figures in (a) look like partially shaded three dimensional cubes, while those in (b) look flat. One "pops out" in (a), but not in (b). A feature that guides pop-out is by definition preattentive. (Its registrations guide the selections of selective attention, so it must be possible for it to be registered without attending to it.) The feature that guides pop out in (a) is not a 2D, image-based feature. If it were, search would be easy in (b) also. Instead what guides attention is "scene-based" shape-from-shading: only one of the figures in (a) appears to be illuminated from the right side. The results suggest that that appearance is preattentive: it here serves to direct attention. Davis and Driver (1994) also focused on the enhancing effects (pop out) of singletons of merely subjective figures. They used a stimulus array in which some portions had the "pac-men" inducers aligned so as to create the impres sion of a Kanizsa square, while in other portions the circles were rotated ninety degrees. In the latter condition the cut-outs are not correctly aligned, no potential edge is given two vertices, and no impression of a subjective square arises. They found efficient search and effortless segmentation of the subjective square, regardless of the number of non-subjective (e.g., merely actual!) distractors. Enclosing each pac-man with a boundary also disrupts the formation of subjective contours, and Davis and Driver showed that the same stimulus, but with pac-men encircled, also gave inefficient search. Now all these results are subject to the criticism that the enhancement by pop-out might rest on the post-attentional effects of the singleton, as it is also the target for which the subject is searching. If so then the speeded reactions do not really demonstrate preattentive feature extraction. So Davis and Driver (1998) reversed the paradigm, aiming to show inefficient search because of the presence of multiple subjective figures. In the later experiments these multiple figures serve as distractors, whose perception makes the task at hand more difficult rather than less. This design goes farther towards showing that the perception of multiple subjective features is automatic or "obligatory" even in cases in which it interferes with the task the subject is trying to complete.
The target is a brown circle with notch cut out of it, aligned at one of the corners of a Kanizsa square. A simple way to see the problem is to compare the left and right panels of Fig. 8 . On the left it is easy to detect the target--the notched circle. That is the only part of the stimulus that contains straight lines and a corner, so it "pops out" from among all the circles. Why is the same notched circle so hard to detect on the right? Notice that the array of circles, including the notched one, is identical in the two panels. But a quick glance at the one on the right seems to reveal nine complete circles. It takes direct examination to determine that the one in the lower left is in fact notched, not complete. The difficulty is that the notched circle on the right appears to be occluded by a square. The square doing the occluding is not a real square, but a Kanizsa square; that is, a "subjective visual surface". Fig. 8 . The target is a notched brown circle, as in the lower left corner. It is harder to detect when it is "occluded by a subjective surface", as on the right. (Davis and Driver 1998, 176) .
The experiment has one other control to ensure that we get appearances of occlusion. The appearances of brown circles are produced by stereoscopic fusion, of red through one eye and (a slightly offset) green through the other, viewed through red-green "3-D" spectacles. In experiment 1, all of the brown circles, both whole and notched, were presented so as to appear on a plane "below" or "deeper than" the plane on which the other pacmen and the subjective surfaces appear (see Fig. 9, A) . By reversing the color filters in the spectacles, one can reverse the disparity, and then the same array of brown circles, both whole and notched, will appear to float "above" the plane on which the pacmen lie. This was experiment 2 (Fig. 9, B) . Fig. 9 . In (A), experiment 1, all the brown circles appear below the plane of the inducers. In experiment 2 (B), the filters were swapped so they appeared above them. (From Davis & Driver 1998, 175) .
Results were what one might expect given the effect seen in figure 8. Search in experiment 1, with the notched targets apparently occluded by the Kanizsa squares, was difficult or "inefficient". ( See Fig 10, A) . It takes a fair amount of time to find each target, and increasing the number of distractors increases that time in a linear fashion. The interpretation of such results dates back to Treisman (1988) . Increasing the number of distractors slows performance because each potential target must be examined in turn. In contrast, when the same stimulus array is presented with reversed disparities, so that the brown circles appear to float "above" the plane of the page, they no longer appear to be occluded by subjective figures on that plane, and search is very efficient. The notched one now "pops out", in a relatively constant and short interval, no matter how many distractors (Fig 10, B) . Davis & Driver 1998, 177.) The only difference between stimuli in Figs. 9A and B is information about spatial configuration: the swapped stereoscopic cues. All that changes is the appearance of occlusion, but that is enough. They run some other experiments to rule out a few other rival interpretations, but in the end the intuitive explanation seems well-confirmed: search is difficult in experiment 1 because in it the targets appear to be occluded.
I believe this result provides compelling evidence for the existence of preattentive illusions. Suppose it is difficult to detect the target in experiment 1 because the target appears to be partially occluded by a Kanizsa square. If there were just one instance of such apparent occlusion, then that one instance would "pop-out" (as happens in Fig. 8, A) . It does not. Ergo, to the subject looking at that stimulus array there appear to be multiple circles each occluded by something. Here those somethings are "subjective" surfaces. Davis and Driver say that their results demonstrate "parallel coding for multiple Kanizsa subjective figures" and that the experiments "are the first to show that several concurrent subjective figures could be coded together in parallel." (Davis & Driver 1998, 182) . If there weren't several of them, we would have pop-out.
It is also important that the target is not the subjective figure, but some thing occluded by a subjective figure. The subjective figures interfere with the search, and make it more difficult; so if deliberate intention or focused attention were required for the "construction of subjective figures", one would think that they would not be present at all. This is why Davis & Driver say the coding of multiple subjective figures is "obligatory" or "automatic". It is not something these subjects could deliberately suppress.
Suppose then that multiple subjective figures are coded simultaneously in preattentive stages of visual processing. A Kanizsa subjective square is an organized collection of (nonveridical) phenomenal properties: something that looks like a square, seems to be lighter than its background, appears to have continuous straight edges, and so on. It must present such appearances if it is to produce the occlusion effect. As they say:
Kanizsa figures could only act as occluders in this way if there was indeed some construction of an illusory surface between the inducers. (Davis & Driver 1998, 174) To the subject there appear to be multiple instances of squares occluding circles. The squares that appear to do the occluding are not real; they are illusory, merely apparent, or "subjective" figures. Appearances thereof do not require selective attention. Ergo we have a preattentive illusion. Ergo our vocabulary of appearance can be satisfied by processes that do not require attention. V A second independent line of evidence for illusions in the absence of selective attention is found in the literature on unilateral neglect. The syndrome is a surprisingly common consequence of ischemic events that happen to damage inferior parietal cortex and the parietal-temporal boundary. Often the culprit is an ischemic event in the middle cerebral artery on one side of the brain. Such events often cause a syndrome characterized by loss of awareness of the contralesional side of space, marked by loss of ordinary orienting and explor atory behaviors aimed at stimuli that occur in that region. (The "contralesional" side is the side of perceptual space opposite the side of the brain where the damage occurred; so a stroke in the right hemisphere often causes left neglect, and conversely.) But such "neglect" can occur without any measurable sensory field defect. Neuroimaging can verify that the retina, optic nerve, V1, and other parts of early visual processing are all normal; "extinguished visual events may still activate visual areas of occipital and ventral temporal cortex, without awareness" (Driver and Vuilleumier 2001, 66) .
Neglect can be assessed by "confrontation" tests: the patient will acknowledge clicks or flashes of light presented on the ipsilesional side, but not on the contralesional side. Asked to tick each of many lines splayed over a page, hemineglect patients will stop after marking those on the ipsilesional side. They might eat from just one side of the dinner plate; groom just one side of their body, copy just one half of a drawing. But all of these can occur without sensory field defects or sensory loss (see Kerkhoff 2001) .
The developing consensus seems to be that neglect and extinction are attentional deficits, characterized by an inability to shift attention towards stimuli on the contralesional side. In neglect that inability is persistent, but in extinction it is manifested mostly in situations in which there are multiple stimuli competing for attention. In such circumstances the patient has diffi culty shifting attention to stimuli on the contralesional side. But if there is little competition for attention the extinction patient has little difficulty attending to the stimulus and reporting its features, no matter where it occurs. This observation, multiply repeated, helps confirm that the deficit is not sensory, and suggests that it lies within the mechanisms that shift attention.
I noted that the experimental literature about Kanizsa figures is large; a portion of it is devoted to their perception by people suffering from unilateral neglect. What happens if we present a Kanizsa figure with half the inducers in the neglected field of a neglect patient? Will we get subjective contours, modal completion, etc: the perception as of a square, brighter than its back ground, lying on top of four circular inducers?
The answer appears to be yes: the neglect patient often will see the figure as a Kanizsa figure (as one figure) , even in cases in which one can demonstrate profound neglect for inducers on the contralesional side. For example, Vuilleumier and Landis (1998) showed that neglect patients will mark the midpoint of a merely subjective Kanizsa rectangle in roughly the same way they mark the midpoints of physically continuous rectangles, but differently from the way they would mark a figure composed of discontinuous blobs of the same sizes and distances. At the same time, if asked to do a same/different matching task, the neglect patients were at chance at detecting differences if those differences were found only on the contralesional side. (In one figure the leftmost inducers might be solid circles, in the other a set of concentric rings, yet the neglect patient would as often as not say the two figures matched one another.) Vuilleumier and Landis say: Experiment 2 showed that the patients had no explicit awareness of the inducing features on the left side of the figures and consistently failed to attend to them for same-different judgments. Altogether, this implies that neglect patients can perceive a subjective figure bounded by illusory contours without being aware of its left inducers. This dissociation between the perception of the illusory figures themselves and the detection of their inducing features strongly suggest that the latter were processed at preattentive stages of vision. (Vuilleumier & Landis 1998 , 2484 . The same/different task is taken to show that the patients have "no explicit awareness" of the inducers on the contralesional side, yet those inducers succeed in inducing a Kanizsa subjective rectangle that extends into the contralesional side. Similar results are found in Ro and Rafal 1996 and Mattingley, Davis, and . In these experiments subjects respond to the stimulus as if they were perceiving a Kanizsa rectangle (e.g. manage sufficient perceptual grouping to perceive it as one thing, instead of four detached inducers), yet they manifest neglect towards, cannot attend to, and cannot successfully discriminate or report upon, the features of the inducers on the contralesional side. The inducers on the contralesional side seem to induce even though the subject cannot attend to them. Now as noted in the previous section, we get the perception as of a subjective figure only if all the inducers successfully induce. If the inducers on one side are blocked, there is no completion of the subjective contours. So modal completion of the shape, apparent occlusion, and all the rest will be blocked. The subject will have no perception as of a (one) shape, distinct from its background, and occluding portions of it.
It follows that if a neglect patient does perceive the figure as a Kanizsa rectangle, then the inducers on the contralesional side are successfully inducing completion of the subjective contours and the modal completion of the rectangular shape. So to the neglect patient there appear to be edges extending into the contralesional side. The rectangular shape itself extends into that region; it appears to have corners in that region. Yet per hypothesis the neglect patient cannot shift attention to stimuli on the contralesional side.
A simple way to put the counter-intuitive result is that modal completion of a subjective surface is a preattentive process (see Mattingley, Davis & Driver 1997) . It is one of the many processes of perceptual organization that can occur prior to and independently of selection by selective attention. But a "subjective surface" is one that only appears to be present. We can't describe the result of this process without employing our vocabulary of appearance.
This literature thus pushes us to contemplate the possibility of visual illusions in the absence of attention. Driver and Vuilleumier (2001) note the analogy between preattentive processing in normal individuals and the sort that unilateral neglect patients can provide for stimuli on the contralesional side. They say "As a first approximation, such processing typically corresponds well with that considered to take place 'preattentively' in the normal system" (Driver & Vuilleumier 2001, 51) . I am suggesting that in both cases the processing can reach levels that sustain the application of our vocabulary of appearance even though it does not engage selective attention (and in some cases, cannot at the moment engage selective attention).
Clark, Spatial Organization

VI.
Now it is time to spell out some of the implications of the dissociation between phenomenal processes and attentional ones.
Consider the main example. To subject S at a particular time t in the Davis & Driver search task there appear to be many squares occluding many inducers. These appearances are sustained preattentively, in the early, parallel stages of visual processing. Suppose in this particular case none of the visual processes in question are receiving any attentional amplification. These processes not only can proceed independently of selective attention, but in this case they actually are so proceeding. S is attending to something else. The preattentive registration of multiple Kanizsa figures can serve to guide selective attention, if S were so inclined; but suppose for now that S is otherwise engaged.
So at least some of features that appear to characterize the figure in front of the subject are such that when they occur, the subject is not attending to them. If attentional amplification is required for a process be active in the global workspace, then the states in virtue of which it appears to S as if there are squares thereabouts are not active in the global workspace. Their contents therefore cannot be broadcast to other consumers within the cognitive organization of S. While in a sense the contents are perhaps accessible (eg if they were amplified they would become active in the global workspace), over the intervals in question they are not receiving any attentional amplification and are not active in the workspace. If one assumes that activity in the global workspace is required for a subject to be able verbally to report on what is represented, then at the times in question our subject S cannot report (by which I mean say anything about) the appearances as of squares occluding inducers. Similarly, if activity in the global workspace is necessary for a process to play a role in general purpose problem solving or deliberation, or to be stored in long term memory, then the unattended appearances as of squares occluding inducers won't be available for general purpose problem solving or deliberation. The subject will not remember them.
Here the comparison with unilateral neglect is helpful. The status of the processes sustaining these appearances is similar to that of the processes sustaining appearances in the neglected field of a person with unilateral neglect. If unilateral neglect is an attentional deficit, then it yields a slightly stronger kind of dissociation between preattentive appearances and accessibility to the global workspace. By hypothesis the subject with unilateral neglect is (not only) not attending to the appearances as of subjective contours and occlusion in the neglected field, but at the time might also be unable to shift attention to stimuli in the neglected field. The condition may just be temporary, lasting only as long as there are competing items of interest in the ipsilesional field, but while it lasts there is a sense in which S cannot shift attention to appearances in the neglected field. So in unilateral neglect S's inability to report how those particulars of the ambient optic array appear is more deeply entrenched than in normal cases of divided or over-loaded attention. It does not arise merely from momentary inattention, but from a more systematic inability to attend. S is not attending to these appearances, and in a sense at the moment cannot attend to them. So S cannot report them. They are not available for general purpose problem solving; they are not candidates for long-term memory.
If we define "introspectively accessible" to include processes whose contents a subject can verbally report, employ in general purpose problem solving, and remember for some time after they occur, then (conclusion number one): at least some of these preattentive appearances are not introspectively accessible. (Recall that some of them might receive attentional amplification; all that "preattentive" implies is that they can proceed without it. One must add the qualification that the process in fact does not receive attentional amplification for it to qualify as introspectively inaccessible.) So introspective methods can't be expected to provide disconfirmatory evidence about them. Those methods might provide evidence consistent with their occurrence, but they cannot show that they do not occur. So in a sense the "phenomenal" outruns introspectibility: it outruns introspective access.
I think other pairings in the four-fold conjunction (phenomenal, grouping, organization, and attentional) fall apart as well. As earlier emphasized, the perception as of a Kanizsa subjective figure requires various kinds of perceptual grouping processes, organizational processes, and in particular processes of spatial perceptual organization. The grouping required is perhaps the most vivid aspect of the Kanizsa figure: that we see various portions of the stimulus in front of us as one square, or one rectangle, or one whatever. On such grouping processes rely the results of Vuilleumier and Landis 1997: there is a perceptible difference if one sees portions of the stimulus as one figure, instead of as four detached and unrelated inducers. The grouping process here yields a whole composed of parts: the subjective figure has edges and vertices, an apparent shape, and some apparent surface properties (or transmissive properties, if the figure in question is transparent, or an "atmosphere"). A second conclusion, then, is that grouping processes yielding such wholes can occur preattentively.
The mention of shape already implies something stronger than "bare" grouping: namely an organization, or perceived structure of relations among the elements composing the group. The most vivid ones are spatial: that those portions of the stimulus appear to be a square (or a rectangle, a triangle, etc) implies spatial relations among its edges. But once the subjective figure is "induced", other relations come into play. The figure appears to lie on top of the inducers, and to occlude them. It appears to be brighter than its back ground. A third conclusion: these aspects of spatial perceptual organization can also occur preattentively.
On a classical line a "gestalt grouping process" is a process of perceptual grouping and organization that yields some introspectively accessible aspect of perceptual appearance. One way to put the conclusion thus far is that some instances of gestalt grouping processes can occur preattentively; they aren't necessarily introspectively accessible, and in particular do not require topdown direction by selective attention. Instead the organized wholes found in a Kanizsa figure are targets to which attention can subsequently be drawn, rather than products for which attention is required.
VII
Awareness of how things appear is a common, indeed pervasive feature of normal perceptual experience. Normally, perceptual experience is an experience of how things appear. It is easy to see why, given their constant conjunction, these two are often thought to be necessarily linked. But the dissociation between phenomenal processes and attentional processes suggests that this particular conjunction of properties can come apart. In the previous section I argued that processes that satisfy our vocabulary of appearance need not be introspectively accessible. Can we get from that to the conclusion that the subject is not aware of them? Or that the subject has no experience of them? As an optional concluding section, I want to suggest how arguments to that effect might go. (It is optional because it is about consciousness!)
The conclusions reached so far agree in several ways with Ned Block (2007) . In fact, here are four ways. The machinery sufficient to sustain perceptual appearance is not coextensive with the machinery needed for accessibility to the global workspace. There exist states that have phenomenal character lying outside the set of states accessible to the global workspace. The informational bandwidth of early visual channels sufficient to sustain appearances exceeds the bandwidth of the global workspace. (I haven't argued for this, but I think it's true.) Last, and least clear: phenomenal content outruns accessibility. The way I would put this is: there exist states in S in virtue of which it looks to S as if ... but those states are at the moment inaccessible to S's global workspace. Not only are they not active but at the moment they cannot be activated.
But beyond that there is a parting of the ways, depending I think on the ways different language users employ words like "aware", "conscious", and "experiential". Suppose the state in hemineglect patient S in virtue of which it looks to S as if there are edges of a rectangle occluding some inducers in S's contralesional field is not only not active in S's global workspace, but also, at that moment, because of the competition ipsilesionally, cannot be attended to, and so is (at the moment) inaccessible. I would think it follows that S is not experiencing those (subjective) contours; S is not aware of them; S is not conscious of them. This is after all the consensus interpretation of unilateral neglect: because of the inability to shift attention, S loses awareness of stimuli in the contralesional field. However, in three places Block (2007 487, 491, 498) suggests that even the inaccessible phenomenological states are never theless "experiential". I don't see how they could be experiential states if they are unattended, inaccessible, and devoid of awareness. However, at this point further discussion of Block would probably devolve into appeals to linguistic intuition, so it is a good place to stop.
